Newsletter 5 | May 2020

EU-LISTCO Newsletter
     
EU-LISTCO newsletter with insightful analysis, latest news, and events.
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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No. 769886

May 13, 2020 | NEWSLETTER 5

Greetings! Welcome to EU-LISTCO’s Fifth Newsletter.


In this issue


EUROPE AND ITS NEIGHBOURS, NOW AND AFTER THE CORONAVIRUS


Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods need a European Union that sticks to its principles as it battles the coronavirus pandemic.

Europe is going through one of its biggest challenges since World War II. That’s what Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, said in a rare state-of-the nation address on 18 March. At first, she mentioned how 1989 had been so monumental for Germany. But then she paused. The country, she said, referring to the coronavirus pandemic, was going through a crisis. ‘The situation is serious. Take it seriously,’ Merkel pleaded. ‘Since German unification, no, since the Second World War, there has been no challenge to our nation that has demanded such a degree of common and united action,’ she added.

Before her speech, much of Europe went into lockdown to stop the spread of the coronavirus. Since then, economies have almost come to a standstill. The EU’s internal borders have been closed. Airports have become eerily empty. In many countries, children can no longer attend school. Restaurants, bars, and cafés remain shut in many places.

After a slow start, the EU’s institutions and member states are now doing as much as they can to provide financial help to businesses, individuals, and various sectors of the economy. When the virus has gone or is contained, leaders hope such support will allow economies to revive quickly. But economists point out that growth will be very slow to pick up and high unemployment will persist in many countries.

The EU’s coronavirus condition has big implications for Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighbours. From investment and trade to labour flows and migration, these countries’ economies have become increasingly tied to the EU. Their stability and ability to cope with the pandemic depends both on their own leaders and on the EU’s policies towards them.

Even though Europe is preoccupied with tackling the virus, it cannot afford to neglect its neighbours. Recovery in these regions will be long. Europe’s neighbours are going to require significant levels of economic help from international financial institutions. And that should include funding for healthcare systems that have suffered underinvestment.

Apart from such help, it is crucial that the EU and its member states speak out against governments that use the virus to accrue more powers at the expense of parliaments, the rule of law, and civil society—both inside the bloc and beyond.

The EU’s response to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s decision to suspend the Hungarian parliament was tepid, to say the least. Orbán insisted that once the virus was over, the emergency powers he had introduced would be lifted. But a return to the status quo ante cannot be taken for granted. And besides, Orbán was already chiselling away at the rule of law, independent media, and NGOs before the pandemic struck.

In Poland, pressure from civil society and the opposition, as well as criticism from the EU, forced the governing Law and Justice party to postpone until July the presidential election that was due to be held on 10 May. It was hard to see how the election campaign would have been fair given that the country was in lockdown. The Polish case shows the resilience of civil society—for now.

Nor can the EU afford to put human rights on the back burner. Take the case of Shady Habash, a young Egyptian film-maker who died earlier in May. He had been imprisoned two years ago in a notorious maximum-security complex for mocking Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in a music video. Habash had appealed for help. In a letter from prison posted on Facebook in October 2019, he wrote, ‘Prison doesn’t kill, loneliness does.’ It was, he added, a struggle to ‘stop yourself going mad or dying slowly because you’ve been thrown in a room two years ago and forgotten’.

In April 2020, Sisi released 4,000 prisoners, but political activists, lawyers, writers, and critics of his regime remain behind bars. It’s a similar situation in Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan uses the pandemic to muzzle his critics.

No experts can be sure how long this pandemic will last. What is clear is that a way of life that was taken for granted inside and outside the EU has, for the moment, been suspended or turned upside down. That doesn’t mean that democracy has to be put on hold. Indeed, for governments to suspend the rule of law, marginalise civil society, and harass opposition parties in the name of containing the pandemic would make values and principles the victims of this virus. All the more reason for the EU to know what is at stake now and in the post-coronavirus era.

Latest Publications

Visualizing scenarios

Scenarios for Governance Breakdown and Violent Conflict in the EU’s Neighbourhood

Sarah Bressan, Johannes Gabriel, Philipp Rotmann, and Dominic Seefeldt
This booklet presents thirteen scenarios for governance breakdown and violent conflict in the EU’s neighbourhood that were created in the context of the EU-LISTCO research project.

Policy paper

Rethinking EU Responses to Global and Diffuse Risks

Kornely Kakachia, Bidzina Lebanidze
The EU needs to prioritise the global risks that not only endanger the EU and its surroundings in the long term but can also act as major spoilers in the short term.

Blog post

Russia’s Long-Term Campaign of Disinformation in Europe

Agnieszka Legucka 
Knowing the strategic goals of Russian foreign policy, the EU must prepare for Russian disinformation being a long-term tool for contesting the order in Europe.

Blog post

Here We Go Again: The EU and the COVID-19 Crisis

Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse
Given the structure of the European Union, the bloc as a whole and its member states have performed much better in the coronavirus pandemic than in the migration crisis.

Blog post

Coronavirus, the International Order, and the Future of the EU

Pol Morillas 
The coronavirus crisis may turn out to be a bump in the road for recent international dynamics, or it may be a turning point in the era of globalisation.

Quick Takes

interview header image
Judy Dempsey asked EU-LISTCO researchers: What has been the impact of the coronavirus on the states, borders, and conflicts in Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods?

Silvia Colombo, Italian Institute of International Affairs

With only sixty-one confirmed cases and two deaths as of 29 April, Libya is among the three countries least hit by the coronavirus in the Middle East and North Africa.

Yet, the impact of the pandemic, which is also linked to the recent dramatic plunge in oil prices, has been heavy on the Libyan conflict. Both forces allied to the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord and those loyal to Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces have been under pressure to launch military offensives.

This pressure has come from two fronts. On the one hand, tribal support on both sides has been shifting in the past few months because of fatigue and the lack of a common agenda. There has also been a significant increase in the number of mercenaries, with Sudanese and Syrian pro-regime fighters flocking into Libya to support Haftar.

On the other hand, most external players who pledged during the Berlin Conference on Libya in January 2020 to contribute to peacemaking are now distracted by the need to respond to the health crisis. As a result, fighting and violence in Libya have intensified in the past few weeks as the coronavirus has spread globally.

Amichai Magen, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

The coronavirus pandemic sweeping the globe represents one of the six risk clusters that EU-LISTCO Work Package 3 identified in 2019. These ‘global and diffuse risks’ were assessed as being likely to undermine resilience in areas already defined by limited statehood and having the potential to trigger governance breakdowns and violent conflict. The pandemic is a gruesome stress test for virtually all states—consolidated and fragile. Much is still not understood about the virus’s behaviour or likely impact on states and societies.

Why, for example, have Israelis and Palestinians cooperated so closely in battling the pandemic, while violent anti-lockdown protests have broken out in parts of Canada, Europe, and the United States?

Why has the virus taken such a devastating toll in places that were supposed to be highly resilient—like Belgium, northern Italy, and New York City—while far more fragile environments, such as densely populated slums in Brazil, Egypt, India, Nigeria, and South Africa, have so far fared much better than initially feared?

The pandemic will have deep and long-lasting implications for global risk assessments and response strategies, but not in the ways that might be expected. With the benefit of hindsight, it is likely that the coronavirus will teach societies surprising and unexpected lessons about the nature of states and the conditions that lead to greater or lesser societal resilience. 

Thomas Risse, Free University of Berlin

At first glance, one would expect weak states with areas of limited statehood to be overwhelmed by the coronavirus pandemic, because they rarely possess well-developed and viable public healthcare systems. However, many weak states in sub-Saharan Africa have so far coped well with the situation and shown more societal resilience than many developed Western countries.

There are three reasons for this. Firstly, strong states with consolidated statehood and centralised healthcare systems can only cope with the crisis if they have political leaders who behave responsibly. In contrast, areas of limited statehood usually depend less on central state capacities and more on decentralised service provision by all kinds of actors, including foreign aid agencies, international organisations, NGOs, and even violent nonstate actors such as rebel groups.

Secondly, many areas of limited statehood in remote corners of the world are far less connected to globalised networks than are developed regions in the global North. This might be a blessing in the current situation. Even if central state authorities cannot control national borders, the chances are that fewer people will reach those countries, particularly from the most affected regions of the world.

Last but not least, people in areas of limited statehood have learnt over time to cope with all kinds of crisis. What is more, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, countries have been through viral outbreaks before, such as the 2013–2016 Ebola epidemic, and have adapted their decentralised public healthcare capacities accordingly. So, there is hope for areas of limited statehood and contested orders.

Khalil Shikaki, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 

As a classic case of limited statehood, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is not in full control of its own borders and therefore has limited capacity to contain the coronavirus. The PA’s efforts to contain the spread of the virus is hindered by its inability to know who is entering the PA’s territories from Israel.

Tens of thousands of labourers cross the border to work in Israel every day. More than 80 per cent of documented cases of the coronavirus in the PA are related to labourers who work in Israel and return home in the evening or on weekends and holidays.

Worse, the PA has no control over the 60 per cent of the West Bank that makes up Area C, where hundreds of thousands of Palestinians live with no formal law enforcement. Certain Palestinian areas, such as the isolated Jerusalem neighbourhoods of Kofr Aqab and Shu’fat refugee camp, which can best be described as no man’s lands, are now breeding grounds for the virus.

These areas are either under Israeli military control or formally annexed to Israel. But years ago, the Jewish state, worried about shifts in the demographic balance in Jerusalem between Jews and Palestinians, decided it did not want these Palestinians and built a separation wall that isolates these neighbourhoods. Now, the areas are in neither Israel nor Palestine. After the coronavirus broke out in Kofr Aqab in mid-April, PA security forces moved in to impose movement restrictions and prevent the virus from spreading to neighbouring Ramallah. Israel ordered the forces out but failed to step in and provide measures to reduce the risk to neighbouring towns.

Eduard Soler, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs

The relatively low numbers of cases of the coronavirus in Africa and most of the Middle East could create the false impression that the virus has spared Europe’s Southern neighbours.

Yet, the effects of the pandemic extend well beyond its health implications. Many of Europe’s closest neighbours, such as Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, rely heavily on tourism. Others, such as Algeria, will have to stomach continued low energy prices. Only the richest countries with relatively small populations, for example some Gulf states, can withstand such a loss of revenue. Most of Europe’s neighbourhood was already in a very fragile situation.

Moreover, the economic and political effects of this crisis are now hitting segments of the population that were already vulnerable, such as workers in the informal sector, internally displaced people, refugees, and those with dissenting voices.

Back in 2016, the EU stated that enhancing the resilience of states and societies in Europe’s neighbourhood was a strategic goal. The coronavirus is testing this resilience. This should force the EU to act preventively, starting by extending its solidarity beyond its borders. This is a matter not only of values or credibility but also of interests. The question for European governments is whether they can implement much-needed internal reconstruction plans while dealing with an ignited neighbourhood.

Marcin Terlikowski and Maciej Zaniewicz, Polish Institute of International Affairs

The coronavirus pandemic has affected long-running conflicts and can trigger new ones. Initially, the spread of the virus among combatants, particularly in places with nearly nonexistent healthcare, such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen, may freeze the front lines. Yet, some groups may attempt to take advantage of the pandemic to solidify their gains through offensive moves.

Over time, the economic crisis brought on by the pandemic will determine the course of many conflicts. Faced with a deep recession, authoritarian regimes like Iran’s may seek escalation to consolidate their societies. Fragile states such as Iraq and Lebanon may descend into sectarian fights for economic survival. Seemingly stable regimes like those in Algeria or Egypt may witness a resumption of violence as its root causes are exacerbated by economic trouble.

Then, there is the war in eastern Ukraine, where hostilities continue despite the pandemic. In April, the so-called separatists controlled by Russia maintained their level of attacks on Ukrainian forces. The challenge for Ukraine is how to mitigate the effects of the coronavirus under wartime conditions. A far bigger challenge faces the crisis-hit EU: how to sustain its approach to resolving this conflict, which requires Russia to return to compliance with fundamental principles of international law and agreed political instruments.

The views expressed in the “Quick Takes” are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of the EU-LISTCO project, other project partners, or the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme.

EU-LISTCO MEMBERS SAY

‘Here’s the English version of my long piece on “Lessons from a global crisis: coronavirus, the international order and the future of the EU”. I raise a few points on the impact of the crisis on the global order, populism, the future of the EU.’

Pol Morillas, director of the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs on Twitter     

In the News

Barcelona Centre for International Affairs

Eduard Soler i Lecha
Europe must modify its priorities and incorporate the new situation brought on by the spread of the coronavirus into its relations with the countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa.

Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology

Benno Zogg
The Belarusian government’s handling of the coronavirus is a dangerous bet by a regime afraid of economic downturn and appearing weak.

Polish Institute of International Affairs

Arkadiusz Legieć
The peak incidence of the coronavirus is forecast to hit the Caucasus in mid-May, but the countries of the region are not prepared for it.

Italian Institute of International Affairs

Giulia Cimini
The coronavirus outbreak in Tunisia, although apparently under control, comes at a critical moment for Tunisia’s young democracy.

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The EU-LISTCO Project ended in July 2021. This website is no longer actively managed.

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